الخميس، يوليو 7

الاخبار العاجلة لاحتفال الجزائؤين بعيد المقابر في اليوم الثاني من عيد الفطر السعيد والعائلات الجزائرية تقدم تهاني العيد التعيس لاموات الجزائر مع تقديم قرابيين المياه كهدايا مجانية لاموات الجزائر يدكر ان اموات الجزائرصائمون مند رحيلهم عن اقاربهم والاسباب مجهولة

اخر خبر
الاخبار العاجلة لاحتفال الجزائؤين بعيد المقابر في اليوم الثاني من عيد الفطر السعيد والعائلات الجزائرية تقدم تهاني العيد التعيس لاموات الجزائر مع تقديم قرابيين المياه كهدايا مجانية لاموات الجزائر يدكر ان اموات الجزائرصائمون مند رحيلهم عن اقاربهم والاسباب مجهولة

https://www.youtube.com/user/USEmbassyAlgiers

Caroline Kennedy - Independence Day Message for Algeria (Arabic Subtitles)

https://www.youtube.com/user/USEmbassyAlgiers

L'ambassade des Etats Unis d’Amérique à Alger a réuni de jeunes algériens issus de différentes régions du pays pour participer au programme de formation « La Voix des Jeunes Algériens ». Pendant cinq jours, un formateur de Philadelphie a aidé les participants à acquérir les compétences essentielles pour produire des contenus audio pour différents publics.

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ST-C422-48-63. Jacqueline Kennedy at Reception Following Funeral of President John F. Kennedy

White House Photographs25 November 1963

...Hassel; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika; President...
State Funeral of President Kennedy: White House, post funeral...
White House social affairs

Ajoutée le 4 juil. 2016

Caroline Kennedy - Independence Day Message (English Subtitles)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D4qBaNYS4ic#t=11

http://archive1.jfklibrary.org/JFKWHP/1963/Month%2011/Day%2025/JFKWHP-1963-11-25-C/JFKWHP-ST-C422-61-63.jpg

Speech source: Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers. Senate Files. Series 12.1. Speech Files, 1953-1960. Box 898, Folder: "'Struggle Against Imperialism, Part II -- Poland and Eastern Europe,' 21 August 1957."

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM — PART II —
POLAND AND EASTERN EUROPE

In my address to this body on July 2, I spoke of man's eternal desire to be free and independent, of the continuing clash between the forces of freedom and the forces of imperialism, and of the critical challenge which this overriding issue presented to American foreign policy today. I spoke in that context of the handicap to our prestige created by what is regarded as Western imperialism, and specifically of the critical impasse in Algeria. Without attempting to equate Western and Soviet imperialism, I indicated at that time my intention to examine, in a two-part series of speeches, the role of our foreign policy in the continuing struggles between the forces of imperialism and independence within both the Soviet and Western worlds. Having discussed in that address the complex problems of Western imperialism and Algeria, I desire to turn now to the problems posed by the evil of Soviet imperialism.

Just as the challenge of Western imperialism is most critically confronting us in Algeria and North Africa, so, too, does the challenge of Soviet imperialism confront American foreign policy today in one critical area in particular — Eastern Europe and Poland.

The Soviets, of course, regard their actions in Eastern Europe much as the French regard their actions in Africa — as none of our affair. Our own Department of State and diplomatic officials are also likely to regard Congressional discussion of these vital world issues as a trespass upon their private domain.

I am strongly persuaded that the inadequacies of current American foreign policies and programs concerning Poland and Eastern Europe require their public review and re-examination by the Senate, the Congress and the people of the United States — not to assign the blame for our past failures, but to explore what steps might be taken to increase the future effectiveness of our foreign policy in this area.

OUR GOALS AND APPROACH IN EASTERN EUROPE

I realize that it is not difficult to make a popular speech on Poland and Eastern Europe. It is easy to denounce the "treachery" of Yalta; to call upon the enslaved millions to cast off their chains; to decry Soviet brutality and greed; and to predict eventual deliverance of those nations now held captive behind the Iron Curtain. If necessary, it can even be easy to favor American aid — to be delivered only to those satellite nations that become truly independent, or that join an anti-Russian alliance, or that abandon national communism — or to be limited to emergency relief or surplus foods, with its distribution in each village carefully supervised by American observers to guarantee its delivery to the needy and the starving alone.

But such a speech, however plausible it may seem in its oratorical or political context, only makes it more difficult to take the hard decisions and real risks necessary in any effective policy for Eastern Europe. We are reluctant to take risks in this dangerous age; we are reluctant to make hard and unpopular decisions in this popular democracy. But the complex problems of Eastern Europe — the area which at one and the same time represents a great Western setback and a great Western hope — will never be solved with an excess of caution or an avoidance of risk.

It is baffling beyond words to review that so-called "liberation" policy which this Administration has proclaimed and on which it has taken patent rights. In several speeches in 1952 Mr. Dulles sought to shed light on a new "Liberation" policy which would replace the supposed sterilities of "Containment". For example, in a prepared address before a learned gathering in Buffalo on August 27, 1952 Mr. Dulles elaborated a three-pronged program for the freeing of the Iron Curtain satellites. In this speech he emphasized that the Voice of America and other agencies should "stir up" the resistance spirit of peoples behind the Iron Curtain and make certain that they have the assurance of our "moral backing". He went on to say that resistance movements would spring up among patriots who "would be supplied and integrated via air drops and other communications from private organizations like the Committee for Free Europe". Finally he underscored his now-familiar thesis that the Communists would disintegrate from within and that the Russians "preoccupied with their own problems, would cease aggressive actions" and eventually give up and go home "realizing that they had swallowed more than they could digest".

Four years later, on October 29, 1956, the distinguished Vice-President announced confidently at Occidental College that the Soviet "set-back" in Poland and Hungary proved the "soundness" of the Administration's "Liberation" policy. A little more than two weeks later on November 14 the President, in a prepared preface to his press conference, spoke of our sympathy for the suffering people of Hungary — "Our hearts have gone out to them and we have done everything it is possible to, in the way of alleviating suffering". "But", he continued, "the United States doesn't now, and never has, advocated open rebellion by an undefended populace against force over which they could not possibly prevail". One needs little imagination to appreciate the feeling of frustration which overcame the people of Eastern Europe to hear that the United States had never meant the obvious implications of its "Liberation" policy.

It is all very well to talk of "liberation" or "peaceful evolution". But until we formulate a program of concrete steps as to what this nation can do to help achieve such goals, we are offering those still hopeful partisans of freedom behind the Iron Curtain nothing but empty oratory.

AMERICAN POLICY TODAY

I respectfully suggest that the last comprehensive review of our policies with respect to the satellite areas by the Secretary of State failed to provide the specific steps necessary to implement his rhetorical goal of "liberation". In that address of April 23 in New York, Mr. Dulles outlined, as I analyzed his speech, six steps as constituting our approach to Liberation:

(1) "provide an example which demonstrates blessings of liberty", and "spread knowledge of that around the world," through our information and cultural exchange programs.

(2) "see to it that the divided or captive nations know that they are not forgotten" through such means, for example, as sponsoring a UN Resolution condemning Soviet intervention in Hungary.

(3) "never make a political settlement at their expense."

(4) "revere and honor those who as martyrs gave their blood for freedom . . . but do not . . . incite violent revolt."

(5) "make apparent to the Soviet rulers (that) our real purpose" in liberation is peace and freedom and not the encirclement of Russia with hostile forces.

(6) "encourage evolution to freedom . . . and when some steps are made toward independence . . . show a readiness to respond with friendly acts . . . see to it that the divided or captive nations know . . . that a heartfelt welcome and new opportunity await them as they gain more freedom."

This policy, if it can be called a policy, is easily stated and even more easily implemented. It requires practically no risk, no cost, no thought and very little explanation. Its contents are neither new nor tangible — and its results in terms of helping liberate Eastern Europe are speculative, to say the least.

The key to our present policy, I believe, is found in the sixth and final item I quoted from the Secretary's address. We will "show a readiness to respond with friendly acts," with "a heartfelt welcome and new opportunity," whatever that may mean, only "as they gain more freedom . . . (and) some steps are made toward independence," not before. No suggestion is made as to what we might do, in the way of positive and concrete diplomacy, to help them take those steps and gain that freedom.

I believe it is this status-quo policy which has stultified all discussion of new proposals for the area — the terms under which withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe might be arranged, Hungary neutralized or Germany united, proposals which merit more careful analysis than they have been given. It is this approach of broad generalizations and platitudes that treats all European satellites alike, without regard to anti-Russian and anti-Slav traditions (as in Rumania), higher rates of industrialization and living standards (as in Czechoslovakia) and other distinguishing characteristics that lend themselves to individual approaches. And finally it is this attitude — of merely waiting and hoping — that caused us to be caught wholly unprepared for the events in Poland and Hungary last October.

POLAND TODAY

I shall limit my discussion today to Poland — because that is the area of both our greatest failures and our greatest hope, and the area most urgently demanding a reexamination of our current policies. I make no claim that Poland is a typical example of Eastern Europe. On the contrary, it would be dangerously erroneous to assume that our policies and programs for that area may be applied generally behind the Iron Curtain. But the nature and success of our relations with Poland — like a wind, good or ill, that blows through the only open window in a vast and crowded prison — will vitally affect the future, the hope or despair, of every satellite country.

The most important fact about Poland today is that it is different, however easy it may be to dismiss it as just another Communist country. To be sure, it is still in many outward appearances a Communist regime. There are many magnetic pulls toward the Soviet orbit; Russian soldiers still patrol in the country; anti-Western sentiments in the U.N. are supported by Polish representatives. But it is essential that we look deeper than the labels of Communism. Terrorism and thought control have very much diminished; public opinion, very markedly anti-Communist and always anti-Soviet, is influential; and at least a precarious working accommodation has been reached with the Catholic Church in Poland under Cardinal Wyszynski. Visitors in Poland note practically no Red flags and feel little of the inquisitorial pressure that has characterized most of the Iron Curtain countries. We must be very careful not to miss the internal realities of the Polish scene while looking at the outward and legal forms.

Moreover, Mr. President, there has been an increasing decentralization of agriculture. The denationalization and decentralization of industry has not been nearly as effective, but in April the Polish Parliament approved a new budget and economic plan to slacken the rate of heavy industrial expansion and raise the living standards. And perhaps most telling of all, the Polish Government last fall turned for the first time toward the West — for friendship, for increased trade, and for American credit and economic assistance.

The economic assistance was made urgent by the cruel and corrosive results of Communist mismanagement, inefficiency and exploitation. Absentee Soviet centralization and nationalization resulted only in lower productivity, widespread raw material deficits, both labor shortages and surpluses, and increasing uselessness and obsolescence of machinery. At the moment, the unemployment problem is assuming critical proportions. This provides melancholy testimony as to the ability of a directed Communist economy to cure dislocations, maintain planning goals, and allocate raw materials — supposedly the peculiar virtues of a socialist state. The attempt to force a heavy industrialization and rearmament program too rapidly upon an economy milked dry by Soviet demands resulted in drastic shortages of consumer goods and housing, spiraling inflation, and a raging black market. It is no wonder that, without decent living standards, adequate housing or fuel, and ravaged by tuberculosis and other diseases, the Polish people turned rumbling discontent into a violent roar at Poznan, and finally last October insisted upon the new anti-Stalinist regime of Mr. Gomulka.

THE U.S. RESPONSE TO POLAND: THE LOAN AGREEMENT

But it is not my intention today to dwell on Soviet brutality or Polish bravery — for I am sure this body is well aware of both — but to examine instead the response of our own foreign policymakers to the Polish crisis and our preparedness to meet this problem.

The adequacy of that response ought to be reviewed by the Congress now, even after the Polish loan agreement has been concluded — not for purposes of distributing credit or blame, but for purposes of revising our policies and statutes for the future. In my opinion, revision will definitely be in order — for the loan agreement of last June for American aid to Poland can unfortunately be summed up in only five words — too little and too late.

I do not mean to say that that agreement was worse than no agreement at all, that it will accomplish nothing, or that it should be regarded as a waste of American funds and a mistake in American diplomacy. But I do say that this inadequate agreement, coming at such a late date, after months of haggling, indecision, and delay, fell so short of our earlier boasts and our earlier promises that it failed to obtain for either our country or the people of Poland the full benefits for the cause of independence which such an agreement might have achieved.

TOO LITTLE

Permit me to explain further what I mean when I say that this agreement is "too little." American aid under the new agreement will be helpful, to be sure. The Poles, without doubt, appreciate it and will make good use of this assistance and Mr. Khrushchev has indicated that he is not happy about it. But let us compare the assistance contained in this agreement with the needs of the Polish people embraced in their original request, a request which a bolder, more imaginative American foreign policy might have met more closely.

—— The Polish mission originally requested a total of over $300 million worth of aid, to prevent mass unemployment, discontent, sabotage and either a recurrence of violence and revolt doomed to be crushed or a return to complete economic subservience to the Soviet Union. We agreed to less than one-third of the amount requested.

—— Perhaps most desperate of all their needs was the Polish request for one million tons of wheat and other grains — to end compulsory deliveries of grain by the Polish farmers, a chief cause of discontent; to prevent skyrocketing prices from spreading hunger and starvation in the cities; and to reduce reliance upon the irregular supplies of the Russians. One million tons of grain would have provided the Polish Government with an adequate reserve against another bad crop year, and with enough grain for use on the domestic market as a means of holding down inflation and abolishing the compulsory deliveries — a major step in transforming the former Stalinist pattern of the Polish economy, and genuine incentive for greater farm production. But these plans are now less certain — for we agreed to only one-half of the amount requested.

—— The next most urgent request was for at least 100,000 tons of our surplus cotton. The Polish textile industry, one of the nation's most important, employing one-sixth of the labor force, is operating far below capacity, with many mills shut down and thousands out of work, despite a crying need for cloth — and unless their needs for cotton can be met, experts have warned, the industry will be chronically restless and completely dependent on the Soviets. But we agreed to only one-half of the amount requested.

—— The next Polish request was for upwards of $30 million in coal mining machinery. Coal is a mainstay of the Polish economy, constituting 40% of its export trade — and yet their equipment is so outmoded and rundown that productivity is actually below its rate of 20 years ago. New machinery in new mines could do wonders in putting the Polish economy back on its feet without dependence on the U.S.S.R. — but we agreed to less than one-seventh of their request on this item.

—— Finally (in addition to a request for surplus fats, oils and soybeans), the Poles were interested in obtaining $70-100 million worth of American farm machinery, fertilizer and seeds to increase the output of the gradually de-collectivized Polish farms. Once Poland was the breadbasket of East Central Europe — now there is not enough grain to supply bread for her own people. Here again, this nation had a dramatic opportunity to demonstrate to other Iron Curtain countries that courage in turning away from complete Soviet domination, and looking to the West for aid, could mean a better life for the farmer and the consumer. But we failed to grant a single dollar of this request.

I say, therefore, that our final offer was too little to match the striking opportunity that has been ours to seize. Mr. Gomulka is grateful for the help, and he needs it badly — but considering the risk undertaken by his government in turning to the West for aid, I can only repeat my statement that our action was too little and too late. The failure by the United States to deliver on implied promises of Mr. Eisenhower's October speech, widely advertised through the Voice of America and other U.S. information media, has brought much disappointment to anti-Soviet Poles and greatly weakened their authority. The frustration of hopes has unquestionably strengthened the anti-Gomulka faction in the Central Committee, which argues that American aid is largely verbal and propagandistic. The pro-Soviet faction in the Central Committee contends that United State assistance is too erratic and meager to provide the catalyst for long-term economic and development. We must make every effort to avoid a further disenchantment with the United States and a heightened acceptance of fraudulent Soviet promises.

TOO LATE

Why do I say "too late"? Let us review the record of events following the dramatic "Polish Revolution" of last October. On October 20, President Eisenhower promptly pledged the United States to offer economic aid to Poland because of our mission to "expand the areas in which free men and free government can flourish"; and the official Polish newspaper Trybuna Ludu commented editorially that "we are in favor of assistance with no political strings attached". The Polish Government thereupon advised the United States that it would be interested in concluding a loan agreement. But other than a reiteration on December 18 by Secretary Dulles of our willingness to "give assistance to Poland, which would assist it to maintain its growing independence," the American Government took no further steps. Finally, the welcome-mat was haltingly extended in February after four precious months had gone by; and negotiations began here on February 26. Then, while the Gomulka regime teetered on a dangerous tightrope between a new bloody, fruitless revolt and a return to Soviet domination, we offered delay and indecision, and we extended an offer of aid so small the Polish delegation dared not return home with it. On May 26, as negotiations continued to drag, a news dispatch from Warsaw reported that the Poles were forced once again to ask Moscow for increased economic help. "Long before now," the report went on, "the Poles had hoped to be receiving United States economic assistance that would have made it unnecessary to turn to their mighty Eastern neighbor again. A sense of frustration and dismay has been gathering strength for weeks in Poland over the failure to complete the Polish-United States negotiations in Washington." Finally, after nearly four more precious months had passed, a partial agreement was signed in June.

The need to set our economic relations with Poland in a fresh perspective is further underscored by the fact that the survival of the Gomulka regime is more and more dependent on economic progress and specific achievements. Mr. Gomulka's early successes rested primarily upon a political ascendancy and a political detachment from the U.S.S.R. Inevitably these successes will fade into the background and popular anticipation of economic improvement will have to be met. The Polish story is but one more lesson illustrating the close harness in which political and economic development occur in the modern world. A political convalescence has no durability unless it is invigorated by economic therapy.

THE RATIONALE OF ECONOMIC AID TO POLAND

There were two fundamental reasons for the failure to meet fully Poland's needs and our opportunities. The first was a pervading doubt as to whether aid to this Communist state was a wise policy after all. The distinguished Minority Leader, I know, has strongly criticized such a policy; and its controversial nature convinced the Administration that it should not request Congress for the specific statutory authority necessary to make the loan complete. The negotiations dragged on while the risks were weighed — and they were very real risks. There was the risk that we would be doing nothing more than aiding the prestige of a Communist regime that all too often praised the Soviet Union and criticized the West; strengthening the Communist bloc; relieving pressure on the Soviets; and permitting the U.S.S.R. to divert to armaments those resources devoted to staving off Polish discontent. Others warned that extensive American aid to Red-occupied Poland may serve only as a pretext for violent Soviet intervention, permanently crushing the Gomulka government and completely wasting any American investment.

No, I do not say that there are no real risks in aiding the Gomulka government. But I do say that the United States had an even greater responsibility as leader of the free world, to take those risks, to meet this opportunity and this challenge. Any other course would have either forced a suffering nation into a fruitless revolt — or forced the Polish Government to become hopelessly dependent once again on Moscow completely on Moscow's terms. Any failure on our part to help Poland today is only encouraging the Polish Stalinists — who have already considerably exploited the delay in our loan negotiations — in their anti-Western propaganda; and it is very possibly causing the collapse of the present, more independent government. Other satellites, we may be sure, are watching — and if we fail to help the Poles, who else will dare stand up to the Russians and look westward?

If, on the other hand, we take these risks, through a more adequate program of loans and other assistance, and provide a dramatic, concrete demonstration of our sympathy and sincerity, we can obtain an invaluable reservoir of good will among the Polish people, strengthen their will to resist, and drive still a further wedge between the Polish Government and the Kremlin. For the satellite nations of Eastern Europe represent the one area in the world where the Soviet Union is on the defensive today, the tender spot within its coat of iron armor the potential source of an inflammation that could spread infectious independence throughout its system, accomplishing from within what the West could never accomplish from without.

Poland may still be a satellite government — but the Poles, as I have said many times, are not satellite people. To deny them help because they have not been able to shake off total Communist control would be a brutal and dangerous policy, either increasing dependence on Russia, driving them into the slaughter of a fruitless, premature revolt, or causing them to despair of ever regaining their freedom.

It is difficult to believe the latter could ever come about. I was in Poland less than two years ago. I saw first-hand not only the total repression which gripped that country in contrast with the gradual increases in freedom we have witnessed since last October; but I saw, too, that the Polish people of the mid-20th century would never in their hearts accept permanent status as a Soviet colony. Indeed, the people of Poland — because of their religious convictions and strong patriotic spirit, because of their historical hatred of the Russians — are perhaps better equipped than any people on earth to withstand the present period of persecution, just as their forefathers withstood successive invasions and partitions from Germans and the Austrians and the Russians for centuries before them, and just as theirs was the only country occupied by Hitler that did not produce a quisling.

But time works against the people of Poland. It is upon the youth, who have no recollection of a free Poland that the Communists concentrate their attention. Given control over education, given control over all the means of communication, given at least an indirect limitation on the traditional influence of the Church, given all of the weapons of a modern police state and given time to consolidate their gains, the Communists feel that they can remake Poland and the Polish people.

If the Poles come to believe that we in the West, with all of our advantages and wealth, care little about their problems and are unwilling to risk going to their assistance even economically, then even their courageous struggle to preserve the spirit of independence may fail.

I recognize, of course, that others have pointed out advantages for us in refusing aid to the Poles — it will make matters more difficult for their Communist government and absentee Soviet masters, and it will demonstrate our recognition of the degree to which the Polish Government is still within the orbit of Soviet control and ideology. But the hunger and misery of other freedom-loving peoples have never been weapons of American foreign policy — and if there is even a slight chance that this demonstration of friendship on our part will help the Polish people to loosen further the bonds of Soviet domination, then the obvious gains to this nation and the Free World will have been well worth the effort. If, on the other hand, Poland should once again slip completely behind the Iron Curtain, then this nation will have at least demonstrated to the world our willingness to help impoverished, freedom-loving people in any land, whatever the political situation may be.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK HAMPERING POLISH AID

The second reason for the final American loan agreement being too little and too late was the inflexibility of our various foreign aid statutes in dealing with a nation in Poland's unique position between Moscow and the West. The Battle Act, which is the pertinent law governing this aspect of our foreign aid under the Mutual Security Act, and the Agricultural Surplus Disposal Act, recognize only two categories of nations in the world: nations "under the domination or control" of the U.S.S.R. or the world Communist movement — and "friendly nations." They make no recognition of the fact that there can be shades of gray between these blacks and whites — that there are and will be nations such as Poland that may not yet be our allies or in a position to be truly friendly, but which are at least beginning to move out from Soviet domination and control.

Thus, in order for American surplus cotton and wheat to be sent to Poland as a part of this loan, it was necessary for Secretary of State Dulles to make the highly arguable finding that Poland is not "dominated or controlled" by the U.S.S.R. and is a "friendly nation" — a finding which was vulnerable on its face to criticism and ridicule from the opponents of Polish aid. In order for the rest of the loan to go through, the Administration was forced to resort to still another legal artifice to get around the Battle Act, transferring to the Export-Import Bank for loan purposes money from the President's unrestricted Foreign Aid Contingency Fund under Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act — an action which brought with it a $30 million limitation on the amount going to any one country in any fiscal year. Moreover, part of the local currencies resulting from sales of agricultural surpluses are often loaned back to the recipient nation for economic development projects — but this presumably cannot be done in Poland's case because of the Battle Act.

We may, by resorting to these artificial — though self-defeating — devices, have avoided for a time the responsibility of openly ventilating this problem in the Congress and the larger forum of public opinion. But the issue cannot be long smothered. The existing agreement may need additional legislative implementation — a new and more adequate Polish loan undoubtedly will be requested in the near future — and while the Gomulka Government falters and all of Eastern Europe watches its performance and our response, Congress and the Administration must face up to this issue directly.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

For these reasons, I am introducing today a bill to amend the Battle, Surplus Disposal and Mutual Security Acts which would make unnecessary these strained interpretations to sell or loan surplus foods for local currencies to countries in Poland's situation; which would permit regular Export-Import Bank loans, guarantees of private loans, and presumably regular Foreign Aid Development loans under the Mutual Security Act; and which would thus recognize that nations in neither the completely friendly or completely dominated categories may be in a situation where American aid — surplus sales, development loan, commercial loan, technical assistance — might well, if the President so determined on a selective basis, be in the interest of the national security of the United States.

Specifically, this bill would authorize such assistance "whenever the President shall determine that there is an opportunity thereby—

"(1) to assist the freedom-loving peoples of any such nation to achieve greater political, economic, and social freedom and well-being; or

"(2) to enable such freedom-loving peoples to strengthen their capacity to maintain a sovereign national government increasingly independent of outside domination and control; and thus to promote world peace and to strengthen the national security of the United States by expanding the areas in which free men and free governments can flourish."

OTHER STEPS

Finally, what other steps might be taken to help the Poles short of civil or international war?

1. Perhaps the next most important step we could take would be an increase of people-to-people contacts, of cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges, of reciprocal visits by delegations representing every aspect of life in the two countries. In addition to improving our propaganda activities, let us also break through the long isolation from the Western world, imposed upon the Polish people by the Soviets with films, records, and a true picture of life in the West. I emphasize true, for it has repeatedly been shown that cheap sensationalism, public-relations gimmicks, and the propagation of unrealizable promises and hopes only injure our prestige. Though no information program can be perfectly attuned to political needs or address itself to all potential audiences, it is probably true that the British, working with a much smaller budget, have very often had better effect in radio broadcasts to East Europe — especially in their transmissions of simple, unadorned, and factual news broadcasts.

There has been some progress made already in unofficial student-teacher exchanges through the generosity and foresight of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. These are beginnings, which the Congress, acting within the framework of the Smith-Mundt Act, could further consolidate to demonstrate our readiness to take advantage of a unique opportunity to strengthen our ties with the Polish. This kind of "aid" is not costly, and yet is rewarding — especially in Poland where the younger generation and university students and teachers have been singularly brave and resistant to Communist pressures. In no small measure, the Polish revolution is an intellectual revolution fed by the infusion of Western ideas, books and principles of conduct.

2. Secondly, we may strengthen ties by an expansion of trade, visible, and invisible, between our countries. American exports are only a fraction of their pre-war level. Other than Polish hams and coal-tar derivatives, we have done very little to encourage those imports which might be most suitable for our markets. The Poles have indicated their desire to accelerate considerably the flow of commerce between our two countries — and I am confident that some of these wishes can be fulfilled. One very practical step we could take would be to lift the bars — as the Canadians have done — against Polish ships and liners coming to our ports. At a later date it may be possible to certify a Polish air-line for trans-Atlantic air service. These are very practical moves which would have a bracing effect on Polish dollar income, fill a general consumer need with ever enlarging international travel, and encourage people of Polish extraction to make visits to Poland.

There are also "exports" which the United States might make to Poland through private capital investment, possibly with governmental sponsorship. One suggestion which has been under discussion is American sponsorship and financing of a housing district in Warsaw, preferably illustrating also some of the best features of our contemporary architecture and urban planning. We have seen in Berlin how the Germans with Western help have undertaken some large building and construction programs which not only fill vital needs but also offset the impressive showpiece facade of Russian rebuilding in the Stalinallee of East Berlin. In Warsaw, too, we could counter the gaudy and hated Soviet Palace of Culture with such a municipal project.

3. Third, we should explore further the possibilities of offering a program of technical assistance to the Gomulka Government. Such a policy is obviously subject to some of the same risks as economic assistance, but it also offers even greater possibilities for enlarging the independent personality of the Polish nation. I feel certain that ways can be found to help the Poles acquire expert help, especially for agriculture and the management of medium-sized industry.

4. Fourth, the United States should consider some humanitarian relief to repatriates who arc still, twelve years after the War, returning from Russia. This is more in the nature of emergency, short-term aid to tide over some of these persons who are finding it very difficult to locate jobs and shelter. All in all there are about 300,000 returning, of whom 20-25,000 were members of the Polish underground, whom General Eisenhower in September 1944 rightfully called "fellow combatants."

5. Fifth, we must think more clearly and make more specific preparations for effective action in case of another outbreak of violence or Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. The dangers of such a crisis persist in Poland, where anti-Russian sentiment and continued political and economic discontent make Mr. Gomulka's efforts at gradualism very hazardous indeed. It could recur in Hungary — or East Germany — or Rumania, or elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The West cannot be caught again, as it was during the Berlin riots of June 1953 or last fall in Poland and Hungary, without coordinated policies or machinery to meet such a crisis.

For on last October 21, Mr. Dulles, during an era of Republican campaign pacificism, veered to an extreme position when he wrote off completely any possibility of the use of American military means in East Europe, thus inviting Soviet intervention. I suggest that Mr. Dulles and his party, who have often condemned the previous Secretary of State for his January 1950 speech on the Far Eastern perimeter and Korea, might usefully ponder Mr. Dulles' much more sweeping remarks of last October in regards to East Europe. At the very minimum, it would be desirable at once to create a permanent U.N. Observation Commission, ready to fly at a moment's notice to any spot where an advance toward freedom is menaced by Soviet intervention. The recent and classic U.N. Commission report on Hungary, though in the nature of a post-mortem, indicates how world opinion could be rallied if such an investigation could be made on the spot and simultaneously with the rupture of a nation's independence.

6. Finally, we must view the Polish problem in its wider European setting. Though chances for a general European and German settlement are not at the moment bright, we must not foreclose possibilities when they present themselves. New policies and proposals for troop withdrawals, disarmament and neutralization must receive our careful consideration. Moreover, the effect of our present policies — our failure to outlaw genocide, the inadequacy of our assistance to refugees, escapees and repatriates — must be reexamined.

Especially, we cannot honestly overlook the close connections between our policies toward Germany and those toward Poland. Though I agree in very wide measure with the policies of our Government toward Germany under both Democratic and Republican Administrations, there is I think a danger that the very unanimity of support which they have enjoyed makes them a little too rigid and unyielding to changing currents in European politics. The United States has had every reason to rejoice in the statesmanship of Chancellor Adenauer and the impressive leadership he has given in shaping the new German democracy. But I do think that the United States, in assessing this achievement, has in its public statements and in the more informal workings of its diplomacy unduly neglected the contribution of the democratic opposition, the German Socialists, whose resistance to Communism has been stalwart and who may someday become a part of a German Government with whom we shall be allies. Especially in Eastern Europe, it has not been to our interest to make pariahs of the German Social Democrats.

Chancellor Adenauer on August 4 gave public voice to the rising realization that there will soon have to be an exchange of recognition between Western Germany and Poland, despite the unfortunate fact that all the countries of Eastern Europe recognize also the Communist regime of Eastern Germany. There is already substantial trade between Western Germany and Poland, and we should seek to clarify the benefits of an exchange of political recognition between the two countries.

I realize that this raises some collateral issues of great complexity — particularly the question of the Polish Western borders and the German Eastern territories which the Potsdam Agreement passed under Polish administration. This question, perhaps more than any other, serves to create gravitational pulls in Poland toward Russia. It is not possible or proper to freeze the legal status of these territories until there has been a final Peace Conference. The German Foreign Minister, Dr. von Brentano, asserted last December 14 that this was an issue which could be worked out "in a European spirit" and that there are possibilities for negotiation. Our former High Commissioner in Germany, John McCloy, a distinguished Republican who ably served the United States and the cause of the new Germany, has likewise pointed to the danger of failing to determine the future of these territories. This is not a matter on which the United States should impose a settlement, but we can encourage the many reasonable voices in all parties who have recognized the need in Germany to press toward an accommodation of this dispute. Fortunately, with full employment and a sustained prosperity in Western Germany, this is a matter which is less charged with emotional asperities than it was some years ago. It is certainly within the interests of the United States to adopt an attitude which accepts no settlement which has not been recognized by a free Polish nation. To say this is not, of course, to gloss over the fact that many Germans have suffered in these territories and that many expellees — especially the older ones — have not found happiness or even a tolerable existence in their new homes.

Finally, it is obvious that we should, where possible, avoid the minor irritants which can be magnified into national affronts. A small recent example was an action of the State Department in changing methods of issuing passports. Although perhaps meaningless to us, it was provoking to the Poles when the State Department altered the way in which the birthplace of persons born in the Eastern territories is indicated. For nearly twelve years after the War, a person born in Breslau or Stettin was identified as having been born in "Poland." This year the identification was changed to "Germany (under Polish administration)." Whatever the reasons for such an action, it only plays — at this date — into the hands of the U.S.S.R.

CONCLUSION

There is, Mr. President, no single pass-key to freedom in this program, no easy solution by which Poland can gain its freedom effortlessly or by simple counting on the internal erosion of the Soviet Union. Action and foresight are the only possible preludes to freedom. And there are, I repeat, obvious risks. There is a sardonic saying of a Polish exile that we might recall: "I wish," he said, "that Poland would become the world's business rather than the world's inspiration." We have too long covered a nakedness of policy with lofty phrases, which call attention to the glory of Poland, but hardly offer signposts to her salvation. Recent dispatches from Warsaw have made it all too clear that the brave people of Poland are still, even under present conditions, in a prison — however more tolerable their jailers may have become. But are we to ignore their needs because they cannot escape by one leap or by picking one lock? Is this an excuse for inaction? Have we forgotten the words —

"I was Hungry, and you gave me to eat;
Naked, and you covered me;
Sick, and you visited me;
I was in prison, and you came to me."

KN-C30701. Jacqueline Kennedy with President of Israel, Zalman Shazar, at Reception Following Funeral of President John F. Kennedy
White House Photographs25 November 1963Jacqueline Kennedy and Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Massachusetts) greet guests during a reception at the White House, following the state funeral of President John F. Kennedy; Mrs. Kennedy shakes hands with President of the State of Israel, Zalman Shazar. Also pictured: Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Golda Meir; Ambassador of Israel, Avraham...

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Accession Number: ST-C422-48-63

Title: ST-C422-48-63. Jacqueline Kennedy at Reception Following Funeral of President John F. Kennedy

Date(s) of Materials: 25 November 1963

Photographer:

Stoughton, Cecil W. (Cecil William), 1920-2008

Description: Jacqueline Kennedy and Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Massachusetts) greet guests during a reception at the White House, following the state funeral of President John F. Kennedy; Mrs. Kennedy shakes hands with an unidentified man. Also pictured: Federal Minister of Defense of West Germany, Kai-Uwe von Hassel; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika; President of the State of Israel, Zalman Shazar; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Golda Meir; Ambassador of Israel, Avraham Harman; Vice President of Liberia, William R. Tolbert, Jr.; Secretary of State of Liberia, J. Rudolph Grimes; U.S. Chief of Protocol, Angier Biddle Duke (partially hidden); Air Force Aide to President Kennedy, Brigadier General Godfrey T. McHugh. Red Room, White House, Washington, D.C.

Physical Description: 1 negative (color; 2 1/4 x 2 1/4 inches)

Subject(s):

Person(s):

Folder Title:

State Funeral of President Kennedy: White House, post funeral Reception

Series Name:

Cecil Stoughton (Office of the Military Aide to the President).

Series Number: 02.

Collection:

White House Photographs

Credit Line: Cecil Stoughton. White House Photographs. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston

Digital Identifier: JFKWHP-ST-C422-48-63

Ben Bella Visit, October 15, 1962

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Accession Number: WHS:26

Title: Ben Bella Visit, October 15, 1962

Date(s) of Materials: 15 October 1962

Description: Silent motion picture covering the official state visit of President Mohamed Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria to the United States. President John F. Kennedy greets President Ben Bella on the White House Lawn. Also present are Secretary of State Dean Rusk, First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, and John F. Kennedy Jr. Photography by: Cecil W. Stoughton.

Physical Description: 1 film reel (color; silent; 16 mm; 201 feet; 5.5 minutes)

Running Time (Minutes): 5

Running Time (Seconds): 30

Footage: 201

Collection:

White House Films

Contributor:

Digital Identifier: JFKWHF-WHS26

Subject(s):

Heads of state

Person(s):

Place(s):

Washington (D.C.)

http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHF-WHS26.aspx

Ben Bella Visit, October 15, 1962
White House Films15 October 1962Silent motion picture covering the official state visit of President Mohamed Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria to the United States. President John F. Kennedy greets President Ben Bella on the White House Lawn. Also present are Secretary of State Dean Rusk, First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, and John F. Kennedy Jr. Photography by: Cecil W. Stoughton.